Most Border Patrol Apprehensions are for Repeat Crossers, But Agency Data Doesn’t Yet Provide the Full Picture

Published Sep 9, 2022

Using detailed government records, TRAC finds that the percent of Border Patrol (BP) apprehensions that comprise repeat border crossers did not significantly increase when, under Title 42[1], illegal border crossers were not penalized or sanctioned before they were expelled. This finding, based on data obtained from the Border Patrol, is contrary to agency contentions and arguments by policy analysts that immediate expulsions without applying meaningful sanctions such as criminal prosecution to repeat crossers encourages illegal reentry attempts.

Understanding the rate of unlawful reentry after deportation or expulsion—what Border Patrol refers to as “recidivism”—is an important factor in evaluating border enforcement. This report by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University presents findings from a detailed analysis of case-by-case records on all Border Patrol Title 42 apprehensions. It focuses on just how often repeat apprehensions occurred and the characteristics of those who attempt reentries.

Border Patrol records show that some migrants were remarkably persistent in the number of attempts made even after being apprehended not just once or twice, but many times. In these data, previous apprehensions for the same individual as far back as two decades ago were covered, providing a more comprehensive view of previous encounters of illegal reentry attempts. When examining this longer span of time, these records indicated that many individuals had been apprehended well over just a few times, and one individual had been previously apprehended on 81 separate occasions. For most BP apprehensions – about 60 percent – the individual had in fact been previously arrested for at least one unlawful entry.[2] See Figure 1.

These case-by-case details on apprehensions analyzed in this report and obtained by TRAC through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests have been added to TRAC’s free web query tool tracking for the past 15 years all Border Patrol arrests under both Title 8 and Title 42 so the public can delve further into this important topic.

The Importance of Data on Border “Recidivism”

The Border Patrol refers to repeat attempts at unlawful border crossing as recidivism. Yet the true extent of recidivism has not been adequately measured. The Border Patrol defines recidivism as “the percentage of individuals apprehended more than one time by the Border Patrol within a fiscal year” and the agency publishes annual recidivism rates, estimating 10 percent for FY 2017 and 27 percent for FY 2021. [3]

However, the agency’s methodology for producing these numbers has been called into question. The General Accounting Office (GAO), for instance, has been critical of Border Patrol’s methodology, finding specifically that the Border Patrol grossly underestimates the actual rates of recidivism for two main reasons. In the detailed study GAO did in 2017 it first found that as many as half of Border Patrol apprehensions in some sectors had not actually left the country (due to lawful parole, pending court proceedings, or other reasons), and therefore should not be included in a calculation of people who could attempt to re-enter the country. Yet the agency did not adjust recidivism rates to exclude these, thereby under-representing the overall percent of re-apprehensions.

Second, the GAO criticized Border Patrol’s recidivism rates because it only included prior deportation data up to one year in the past, which meant that migrants who had been previously apprehended and deported more than a year prior were treated as if they were making their first entry.

When the GAO adjusted for these two issues—by excluding data on individuals who had stayed in the United States and including data on individuals for three years—the GAO found that recidivism rates were, on average, twice as high as the Border Patrol’s calculations. In two Border Patrol sectors, the GAO found more than seven times greater recidivism than BP’s calculated rates. [4]

As a result of the Border Patrol’s incomplete analysis of its apprehension data, the public lacks accurate and reliable figures on Title 8 as well as Title 42 recidivism rates. Moreover, treating Border Patrol’s apprehension totals as if they were totals of individual people has contributed to confusion about the scale of unlawful migration. Finally, a lack of accurate data on repeat border crossing means that it is difficult to accurately assess factors that contribute to recidivism or to assess claims that specific border enforcement strategies meaningfully deter unlawful migration. If recidivism rises, other things equal, the number of apprehensions will increase, perhaps even dramatically, even if the number of individuals attempting to cross between ports of entry is unchanged.

TRAC’s analysis of repeat attempts to cross the border unlawfully during the implementation of Title 42 expulsions along the U.S.-Mexico border presents a unique opportunity to shed light on some of these issues.

How Many Border Patrol Apprehensions Are For Repeaters?

Details on over 1.2 million individual apprehensions by the Border Patrol covering the period from March 20, 2020, when the Trump administration initiated this new Title 42 policy, and extending through September 30, 2021, after President Biden assumed office were analyzed. These data reveal that over 700 thousand apprehensions out of the 1.2 million involved individuals who had previously been apprehended attempting to enter the country. This translates to almost 6 out of every ten apprehensions were of repeat offenders. [5] Just four out of ten (40.8%) had no record of a previous apprehension. Nearly one out of four (24.6%) had three or more previous apprehensions.

However, repeat reentry attempts varied markedly by demographic characteristics and whether or not the noncitizen was from Mexico. Not surprisingly those from Mexico had a higher likelihood of previous reentry attempts, as did single adults and adult groupings without children (“Other Adults”).

For nonMexican adults without children, a total of 61.4 percent of apprehensions had been of individuals apprehended previously, and closer to one in five (21.6%) had three or more previous apprehensions. For Mexican adults without children, this rises to 66.6 percent with prior encounters, while 30.6 percent had three or more. See Table 1A. Further details on just how many previous attempts beyond 3 were recorded is found in Table 1B.

At the other end of the spectrum were unaccompanied children. Only 6.3 percent of the apprehensions of unaccompanied nonMexican children had previous reentry attempts. In contrast, the majority (53.6%) of unaccompanied Mexican children had been previously picked up – their rates were only modestly lower than for all Border Patrol encounters.

Apprehensions of children who were part of family groups also had fewer reentry attempts, however it was unclear whether Customs and Border Protection (CBP) records failed to record some children’s arrests when they were part of a family group. For example, 71.8 percent of apprehensions of nonMexican adults with children showed no prior apprehension, while 97.8 percent of their children had no recorded prior apprehensions. It is, of course, possible that some of the parents had made previous reentry attempts when traveling alone. A wide differential was also observed for Mexican adults with children compared to the children they entered with. See Tables 1A and 1B.

These data are also unique in that illegal entry attempts for each individual were tracked for two decades. The data make clear that meaningful analysis of recidivism requires details on the composition of who the Border Patrol picks up. And significantly more can be learned examining longer periods of time than a single year – the short time period CBP typically focuses on.

It would not be surprising, for example, to find that adults who are deported from the U.S. who have been separated from established families in the U.S. would be highly motivated to keep trying to get back into the country to be re-united with, and to provide continued support for, their families. Other reasons for persistence likely also exist. For example, adults who grew up in the United States but were deported to Mexico and had no real connections to any other country. But for whatever reason, the persistence of reentry attempts by some is starkly evident in these data.

Deterrence of Repeat Reentry Attempts

CBP officials and other commentators have pointed to the existence of repeat reentry attempts for Title 42 expulsions as a special case because, unlike normal Title 8 removals, individuals face no real consequences such as criminal prosecution, but are simply expelled almost immediately.

To test CBP’s contention that the repeat reentry attempts were a new problem because individuals deported under Title 42 faced no special consequences, TRAC analyzed the pattern of repeat apprehensions of Title 42 expulsions over time.

At the start of Title 42, individuals who were picked up presumably reflected their prior repeat reentry attempts under the Border Patrol’s normal operations. The extent this changed over time would better isolate whether the lack of criminal prosecutions or other sanctions may have resulted in increasing reentry attempts.

In the first weeks of Title 42 covering March 20-April 30, 2020, 42 percent of apprehensions of individual had no prior record of attempting illegal entry. A total of 22 percent had 3 or more prior apprehensions. Eighteen months later during September 1 - 30, 2021, 48 percent of apprehensions of individuals had no prior record of apprehension, in contrast to 42 percent when the program began. The proportion of apprehensions of individuals with 3 or more prior apprehensions was unchanged at still 22 percent. See Figure 2.

Because adults traveling without children were more likely to attempt reentry than were children traveling alone or adults with children, we then focused on reentry attempts by adults alone. We further focused in on Mexican adults since these individuals had the highest number of reentry attempts.

We did find a small increase in reentry attempts by Mexican adults traveling alone during this time period. However, the change observed was well within the natural range of month-to-month variation. A total of 35 percent of apprehensions of individuals in the first weeks of Title 42’s implementation had no prior record of attempting illegal entry. Eighteen months later during September 1 – 30, 2021, this had decreased to 34 percent. Likewise, a total of 28 percent had three or more prior encounters at the beginning of the period, and during the last month of this time period it was 31 percent.

Because of the month-to-month variation that was observed, it is difficult to conclude the existence of a significant trend as there may be further composition effects not controlled for. Indeed, the time series plot in Figure 3 for Mexican adults traveling alone displays rates that change very little throughout the period. (For detailed statistics concerning these trends, see Tables 2-4.)

Conclusion

These detailed government records document that reentry attempts persist among a large proportion of noncitizens apprehended by the Border Patrol. Despite rearrests again and again, reentry attempts continue. The Trump administration instituted many initiatives to stop individuals from illegally entering the country along our southwest border with Mexico. Despite these initiatives, these records show little evidence that apprehensions reduced reentry attempts. Persistent illegal reentry attempts continued into the Biden administration particularly among adults traveling alone.

With the range of complex push and pull factors that cause individuals to leave their home country and seek to come to this country, it is unclear whether aggressive enforcement efforts and sanctions alone will ever be successful in stopping these migration flows. It is clear, however, that without better data tracking individuals and their characteristics, rather than merely counting enforcement events, we will not have an adequate handle on what border control policies are better and more cost effective in the long run at achieving this country’s goals.