The Mariel boatlift was an influx of asylum seekers during a seven-month period in 1980 when approximately 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians arrived by boats to South Florida. This mass migration became known as the Mariel boatlift because most of the Cubans departed from Mariel Harbor in Cuba.

**U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants**

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**Summary**

The devastation of Tropical Storm Jeanne coupled with escalating civil unrest and armed rebellion in Haiti has renewed congressional interest in U.S. policy on Haitian migrants, particularly those attempting to reach the United States by boat. While some observers assert that the arrival of these Haitians demonstrate a breach in border security, others maintain that these Haitians are asylum seekers following a 30-year practice of Haitians coming by boat without legal immigration documents. Migrant interdiction and mandatory detention are key components of U.S. policy toward Haitian migrants, but human rights advocates express concern that Haitians are not afforded the same treatment as other asylum seekers arriving in the United States. This report does not track developments but will be updated if policies are revised.

**Migration Trends**

The widely-televised appearance of at least 220 Haitians washing ashore in Biscayne Bay, Florida, on October 29, 2002, captured considerable attention, but the practice of Haitians coming to the United States by boat without proper travel documents reportedly dates back 30 years. An estimated 25,000 Haitians were among the mass migration of over 150,000 asylum seekers who arrived in South Florida in 1980 during the Mariel boatlift. The U.S. Coast Guard, as described below, has been interdicting vessels carrying Haitians since 1981, a policy resulting from the Mariel Boatlift.

Figure 1 presents the U.S. Coast Guard data on Haitian migrants that the Coast Guard has encountered on boats and rafts in the years following the Mariel boatlift. Most notably, there was a drop of migrants after the Haitian elections in 1990 followed by a dramatic upturn after the 1991 coup (discussed below). As U.S. policy responses to the surges in Haitian boat people are considered below, the spikes and valleys in Figure 1

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become more understandable. Since FY1998, the Coast Guard had interdicted over 1,000 Haitians each year with 1,486 being picked up in FY2002, 2,013 picked up in FY2003, and 3229 in FY2004. As of January 19, 2005, the Coast Guard has interdicted 702 Haitians.2

Not all Haitian migrants are interdicted and returned to Haiti by the Coast Guard, as is apparent with the October 29, 2002, landing of at least 220 Haitians. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detained 167 Haitians after their boat ran aground in South Florida on December 3, 2001. The Coast Guard also estimates that 75 Haitians landed in the United States without apprehension from October 1, 2002, through February 28, 2003.

### Figure 1. U.S. Coast Guard Interdiction of Haitians, 1982-2004

Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Coast Guard data.

### Policy Evolution

**Post-Mariel Policy.** The Carter Administration labeled Haitians as well as Cubans who had come to the United States during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift as “Cuban-Haitian Entrants” and used the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to admit them. It appeared that the vast majority of Haitians who arrived in South Florida did not qualify for asylum according to the newly-enacted individualized definition of persecution in §207-§208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980).3 Subsequently, an adjustment of status provision was included in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 that enabled Cuban-Haitian Entrants to become legal permanent residents (LPRs).4

**Interdiction Agreement.** In 1981, the Reagan Administration reacted to the mass migration of asylum seekers who arrived in boats from Haiti by establishing a program to interdict (i.e., stop and search certain vessels suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians). This agreement, made with then-dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to board and inspect private Haitian vessels on the high seas and to interrogate the passengers. At that time, the United States generally viewed Haitian boat people as economic migrants deserting one of the poorest countries in the world.

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2 For detailed data on U.S. Coast Guard migrant interdictions, see [http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/amio/flowstats/fy2004%20migrant%20flow.xls].

3 Aliens must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Under the original agreement, an INS interviewer and Coast Guard official, working together, would check the immigration status of the passengers and return those passengers deemed to be undocumented Haitians. An alien in question must have volunteered information to the Coast Guard or INS interviewer that she or he would be persecuted if returned to Haiti in order for the interdicted Haitian to be considered for asylum. Ultimately, INS would determine the immigration status of the alien in question. From 1981 through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Of this number, INS considered 11 Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the United States.

**Crisis After the Coup.** The 1991 military coup d’etat deposing Haiti’s first democratically elected President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, however, challenged the assumption that all Haitian boat people were economic migrants. The State Department reportedly hesitated on whether the Haitians should be forced to return given the strong condemnation of the coup by the United States and the Organization of American States. By November 11, 1991, approximately 450 Haitians were being held on Coast Guard cutters while the administration of then-President George H. W. Bush considered the options. The former Bush Administration lobbied for a regional solution to the outflow of Haitian boat people, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) arranged for several countries in the region — Belize, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela — to temporarily provide a safe haven for Haitians interdicted by the Coast Guard. Some of the other countries in the region were each willing to provide safe haven for only several hundred Haitians. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard cutters were becoming severely overcrowded, and on November 18, 1991, the United States forcibly returned 538 Haitians to Haiti.

**Pre-Screening and Repatriation.** The options for safe havens in third countries in the region proved inadequate for the sheer numbers of Haitians fleeing their country, and the former Bush Administration began treating the Haitians fleeing by boat as asylum seekers. The Coast Guard took them to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba, where they were pre-screened for asylum in the United States. During this period, there were approximately 10,490 Haitians who were paroled into the United States after a pre-screening interview at Guantanamo determined that they had a credible fear of persecution if returned to Haiti. On May 24, 1992, citing the surge of Haitians that month, then-President Bush ordered the Coast Guard to intercept all Haitians in boats and immediately return them without interviews to determine whether they were at risk of persecution. The Administration offered those repatriated the option of in-country refugee processing.5

**Safe Haven and Refugee Processing.** The repatriation policy continued for two years, until then-President Bill Clinton announced that interdicted Haitians would be taken to a location in the region where they would be processed as potential refugees. The refugee processing policy lasted only a few weeks — June 15 to July 5, 1994. Much like the former Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration cited the exodus of Haitian boat people as a reason for suspending refugee processing. Instead, the new policy became one of regional “safe havens” where interdicted Haitians who expressed a fear of

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5 For a complete analysis of U.S. policy on Haitian migration through 1992, see CRS Report 93-233, Asylum Seekers: Haitians in Comparative Context, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. (Archived report available from author.)
persecution could stay, but they would not be allowed to come to the United States. In 1993, in-country refugee processing was further expanded to Les Cayes and Cape Haitien.

**Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA).** When Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in November 1997 that enabled Nicaraguans and Cubans to become legal permanent residents and permitted certain unsuccessful Central American and East European asylum applicants to seek another form of immigration relief, it opted not to include Haitian asylum seekers. The following year, Congress enacted the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 (S. 1504/H.R. 3049) that enabled Haitians who filed asylum claims or who were paroled into the United States before December 31, 1995, to adjust to legal permanent residence. HRIFA was added to the FY1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) at the close of the 105th Congress.6 According to the most recent data available, a total of 15,494 Haitians have adjusted under HRIFA as of FY2002.

**Mandatory Detention of Aliens in Expedited Removal.** Since enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-208), aliens arriving in the United States without proper immigration documents are immediately placed in expedited removal. If an alien expresses a fear of being forced to return home, the immigration inspector refers the alien to a asylum officer who determines whether the person has a “credible fear.” IIRIRA requires that those aliens must be kept in detention while their “credible fear” cases are pending.7 As a result, those Haitians who do make it to U.S. shores and do express a fear of repatriation are placed in detention. After the credible fear determination, the case is referred to an Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration judge for an asylum and removal hearing, (during which time there is no statutory requirement that aliens be detained). EOIR granted asylum to 477 Haitians in FY2002 and to 369 in FY2001.

**National Security Risk.** On November 13, 2002, the INS published a notice clarifying that certain aliens arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled are to be placed in expedited removal proceedings and detained (subject to humanitarian parole).8 This notice concluded that illegal mass migration by sea threatened national security because it diverts the Coast Guard and other resources from their homeland security duties. The Attorney General expanded on this rationale in his April 17, 2003, ruling that instructs EOIR immigration judges to consider “national security interests implicated by the encouragement of further unlawful mass migrations...” in making bond determinations regarding release from detention of unauthorized migrants who arrive in “the United States by sea seeking to evade inspection.”9 The case involved a Haitian who had come ashore in Biscayne Bay, Florida, on October 29, 2002, and had been released on bond by

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7 For more discussion of detention policy, see CRS Report RL31606, *Detention of Noncitizens in the United States*, by Alison Siskin and Margaret Mikyung Lee.

8 *Federal Register*, vol. 67, no. 219, pp. 68923-68926 (Nov. 13, 2002).

an immigration judge. EOIR’s Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had upheld his release, but the Attorney General vacated the BIA decision.\(^\text{10}\)

**Changing Administrative Roles.** Now that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) abolished INS and transferred its functions from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to several bureaus in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the responsibilities for Haitian migrants are spread across DHS’s Coast Guard (interdiction), Customs and Border Protection (apprehensions and inspections), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (detention), Citizenship and Immigration Services (credible fear determination) and DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (asylum and removal hearings). It is evident from the Attorney General’s April 17, 2003 ruling, however, that he will continue to play a key role in setting asylum and removal policy. Meanwhile, DHS has finalized its plan to respond to mass migration emergencies, known as “Vigilant Century.”

**Current Issues**

**Parole from Detention.** DOJ acknowledges that it instructed field operations “to adjust parole criteria with respect to all inadmissible Haitians arriving in South Florida after December 3, 2001, and that none of them should be paroled without the approval of INS headquarters.”\(^\text{11}\) The Administration maintains that paroling Haitians (as is typically done for aliens who meet the credible fear threshold) may encourage other Haitians to embark on the “risky sea travel” and “potentially trigger a mass asylum from Haiti to the United States.” The Administration further argues that all migrants who arrive by sea pose a risk to national security and warns that terrorists may pose as Haitian asylum seekers.

Critics of the Administration’s Haitian parole policy focus on the 167 Haitians detained after their boat ran aground in South Florida on December 3, 2001, a majority of whom reportedly passed the initial credible fear hearing. Critics maintain that the Haitians are being singled out for more restrictive treatment.\(^\text{12}\) They challenge the view that Haitians pose a risk to “national security” and assert that the term is being construed too broadly, being applied arbitrarily to Haitian asylum seekers, and causing a waste of limited resources.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{10}\) CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, *Policy Implications of Department of Justice Ruling on Bond Determinations for Unauthorized Aliens in Detention*, by Alison Siskin, May 1, 2003.


Access to Legal Counsel. Concern has also arisen that the detention of Haitians is interfering with access to legal counsel to aid with their asylum cases. According to recent testimony, attorneys in South Florida for the Haitians maintain that they face various obstacles, including restricted hours to meet with clients and a serious lack of adequate visitation space. Pro bono lawyers working with Haitians housed in the Krome Detention Center and the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center argued that they experienced long delays waiting to see clients. Others point out that the expedited removal provisions in INA were enacted to do just that — expedite removals. Aliens without proper immigration documents who try to enter the United States, they argue, should not be afforded the same procedural and legal rights as aliens who enter legally.

Contrast with Cubans. U.S. immigration policy toward migrants from Cuba and Haiti are often discussed in tandem because there are several key points of comparison. Both nations have a history of repressive governments with documented human rights violations. Both countries have a history of sending asylum seekers to the United States by boats. Finally, although U.S. immigration law is generally applied neutrally without regard to country of origin, there are special laws and agreements pertaining to both Cubans and Haitians (as discussed above). Despite these points of similarity, the treatment of Cubans fleeing to the United States differs from that of Haitians. Cuban migrants receive more generous treatment under U.S. law than Haitians or foreign nationals from any other country. This policy is embodied in the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966 (P.L. 89-73), as amended, which provides that certain Cubans who have been physically present in the United States for at least one year may adjust to permanent residence status at the discretion of the Attorney General. As a consequence of special migration agreements with Cuba, a “wet foot/dry foot” practice toward Cuban migrants has evolved. Put simply, Cubans who do not reach the shore (i.e., dry land), are interdicted and returned to Cuba unless they cite fears of persecution. Those Cubans who successfully reach the shore are inspected for entry by DHS and generally permitted to stay and adjust under CAA the following year.

Tropical Storm Jeanne. On September 21, 2004, the U.S. Ambassador declared Haiti a disaster due to the magnitude of the effects of Tropical Storm Jeanne. Massive flooding caused by the storm left 3,006 people dead, and 300,000 homeless. An estimated 80% of crops were destroyed. Some have called for Secretary Ridge to grant TPS to Haitians in the United States. They maintain that Haiti temporarily cannot handle the return of nationals due to the environmental disaster and that there are extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitians from returning safely. Others warn that any policy shift would prompt a mass exodus of Haitians, which in turn would divert and strain homeland security resources.

14 Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Hearing on Haitian Asylum Seekers.
15 CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.